{"id":1012,"date":"2020-11-03T09:01:01","date_gmt":"2020-11-03T09:01:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/de.fi\/blog\/?p=1012"},"modified":"2023-09-17T11:00:39","modified_gmt":"2023-09-17T11:00:39","slug":"how-deus-finance-fixed-its-code-following-a-defiyield-info-report-51775ef59a5b","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/de.fi\/blog\/how-deus-finance-fixed-its-code-following-a-defiyield-info-report-51775ef59a5b","title":{"rendered":"How Deus.finance Fixed Its Code Following a De.Fi Report"},"content":{"rendered":"

This is an exciting narrative of how the events surrounding the Deus.finance project took place.<\/em><\/p>\n

Act #1<\/strong><\/p>\n

It all started with the Deus.finance project review. After performing a detailed analysis, I came to the conclusion that Deus was alarming and that it lay in a sort of defi no-man\u2019s-land, neither centralized nor decentralized. The point was that the owner of the smart contract had lots of permissions like the opportunity to transfer all the rewards and staked tokens to any address without a timelock. Based on these facts, I rated Deus as having a high risk of scam probability. The project\u2019s fate and users\u2019 safety fully depended on the owner\u2019s decisions.<\/p>\n

\"[https:\/\/t.me\/de.fi\/145](https:\/\/t.me\/defiyield_ann\/145)\"<\/p>\n

Immediately after the publication of the post, one of Deus\u2019s team members, called Lafayette, answered the post claiming that such an implementation was temporary because the team required it to develop the platform in the right way.<\/p>\n

\"[https:\/\/t.me\/de.fi\/13028](https:\/\/t.me\/defiyield_app\/13028)\"<\/p>\n

However, less than an hour later, Lafayette posted again stating that the contract ownership had been transferred to a DAO (governance) on Aragon.<\/p>\n

\"[https:\/\/t.me\/de.fi\/13058](https:\/\/t.me\/defiyield_app\/13058)\"<\/p>\n

Act #2<\/strong><\/p>\n

On November 4th, the story continued. I agreed that this model of ownership looked much more trustable; crucial changes could be implemented only through the voting process. However, I paid attention to the nuance that 23% (~38,000) DEA tokens lay in the EOA address, and I posted this info as well.<\/p>\n

\"[https:\/\/t.me\/de.fi\/13218](https:\/\/t.me\/defiyield_app\/13218)\"<\/p>\n

It made me update the scam probability to Medium as the token dump initiated by the team still might take place and users\u2019 safety remained in question.<\/p>\n

But it wasn\u2019t over yet. 20 minutes after my post was published, 23% of DEA tokens were transferred to the Aragon DAO contract.<\/p>\n

\"[https:\/\/t.me\/de.fi\/13228](https:\/\/t.me\/defiyield_app\/13228)\"<\/p>\n

At last, the team had gotten rid of the compromising factors that guided my original ranking, allowing me to change the scam probability to Low and consider the Deus project to be fully decentralized and community-driven.<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n

To recap, I think that my efforts yielded great results. The risks associated with the Deus project have been decreased from High to Low. Credit must also go to the Deus dev, of course, for retroactively fixing the issues.<\/p>\n

The aim with my audits is to bring as much light as possible to project implementations so users get the whole picture and become aware of possible risks.<\/p>\n

I encourage other project founders to transform their projects in such a manner that only code runs them. This will significantly decrease the risks to Yield Farming, making it fully decentralized and governance-driven. That is what users deserve.<\/p>\n

Check out other articles from the Saga series:<\/p>\n